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Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison 
John B. Mitchell1 and Kelly Kunsch2 
 INTRODUCTION 
There were jokes popular in the 1950s called “moron” jokes.  They did 
not target any race, nationality, or profession (like lawyers)—they just 
targeted morons.  Question: “Why did the moron jump off the Empire State 
Building?”  Answer: “He wanted to make a hit on Broadway.”  Typical 
moron joke—stupid.  But there was one that seemed to capture a bit of 
insight into the human character.  Question: “Why did the moron keep 
hitting his head against the wall?”  Answer: “Because it felt so good when 
he stopped.”   
Apparently those who legislate and enforce the laws in  lower courts, 
dealing with traffic misdemeanors, have never heard the joke: they keep 
hitting their heads against the proverbial wall, but they do not stop.  
Unfortunately, metaphorically, this wall is made up of low-income people 
whose driver’s licenses are revoked because they cannot afford to pay 
traffic fines.  Consequently, this results in the criminalization of low-
income people for driving without being able to pay one of the associated 
costs of driving  (i.e., traffic fines), and the conversion of the driver’s 
license into a form of collateral for that debt.3 
In our society, the driver’s license is a precious commodity, and if the 
government threatens to take our’s away, it is certain to capture our 
attention.  Therefore, it is hardly surprising that courts and legislatures 
throughout the country have chosen to use the threat of imposing an 
administrative suspension of an individual’s driver’s license as a means of 
coercing the individual to pay any unpaid fines for traffic tickets.  While 
this approach to debt collections might have made sense at its inception, 
currently, this approach is impractical; the entire enterprise of using driver’s 
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license suspensions to collect fines from low-income individuals is 
seriously misguided.  The story that follows is not an uncommon scenario; 
it illustrates what we refer to throughout this article as “the cycle.” 
A NOT SO UNUSUAL STORY 
In a court whose jurisdiction included misdemeanor traffic offenses, 
Sally Jones (Sally) is found guilty of her third conviction for driving with a 
revoked driver’s license,4 and is sent to jail for several months.5  Sally’s 
conviction appears appropriate, one might think; she obviously does not get 
the point, and it is time for some “specific deterrence”6 in the form of 
serious jail time to drive the point home to her.  Often, however, when one 
looks more closely, the story may be very different than the simple tale of 
crime and punishment imagined. 
Sally7 once had a driver’s license, which was subsequently revoked.  But 
here the story deviates  from expectations.  Sally is a single mother who 
lives with her sister, who is also a single mother.  Her sister works during 
the day and Sally watches the children.  Sally works at night and her sister 
watches the children.  They live outside the city, because housing in the city 
is unaffordable.  Sally drives to work because the available public 
transportation is neither sufficiently direct nor frequent enough (since she 
works the night shift) to offer even a remotely rational transportation 
option. 
Sally’s driver’s license was not originally revoked for driving while 
intoxicated, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, excessive moving 
violations, or any other offense related to the safe handling of a motor 
vehicle.  Rather, she did not pay a fine8 imposed for running a stop sign and 
for driving a vehicle with expired tabs.  Sally received the ticket, but threw 
it in her glove compartment and forgot about it;9 she did not look carefully 
at the ticket and thought that she would hear from the court.  Meanwhile, 
Sally’s ticket debt was compounding.  Immediately after the infraction was 
issued, “statutory fees” were added (in Washington, 120 percent of the cost 
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of the assessed fine for the infraction).10  When Sally did not respond, a 
default fee was added.11  Shortly thereafter, Sally’s case was referred to a 
collection agency, which then added another 30 percent collection fee on 
the top12 and 12 percent interest on the total unpaid debt. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Licensing (DOL) learned of the large 
unpaid fines and administratively suspended Sally’s driver’s license.13  
Sally, however, did not receive notice of the suspension.14  She had moved 
several times and at some point forgot to notify the DOL of her new 
address.  Even if Sally had notified the DOL of her change of address, it 
would not be all that uncommon for the DOL database to fail to accurately 
note the changes and thereby send the notice to a wrong or non-existent 
address.15   
Then one evening on the way home from work, Sally was pulled over 
because her left taillight was out.  After a computer check by the police 
officer revealed a suspension on Sally’s driver’s license, she was arrested 
and charged with a misdemeanor, driving with a suspended driver’s license 
in the third degree (hereinafter DWLS3).16 
When Sally went to court for her first appearance, there were no public 
defenders present.17  Sally talked to the prosecutor, waived her right to 
counsel, and made some deal, pleading guilty to DWLS3.  Consequently, 
another set of large fines now were added to what she owed.18  If Sally 
could have written a check for what was then well over a thousand dollars 
in fines, she would have her driver’s license back.  But Sally did not have a 
check or even a checking account.  More importantly, she did not have the 
money to spend on something that would not bring in real goods or 
services, and would deplete her entire share of more than a month of food, 
shelter and clothing19 for her and her family.20  So, Sally decided that she 
would not have a driver’s license.21  Neither she nor her sister wanted to 
raise their children on welfare.  She could not pay the fine,22 but wanted to 
work.  Realistically, that meant driving. 
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Although Sally was well aware that she was driving with a revoked 
driver’s license, she kept driving; she needed to get back and forth to her 
minimum wage employment and to take her children and her sister’s 
children to doctors and daycare.  Sally’s chances of getting stopped by law 
enforcement were statistically higher than most of us, since she was driving 
a “junker” car, replete with a variety of mechanical violations, including a 
cracked windshield and a broken taillight.  Each time Sally was stopped by 
a police officer and issued a ticket, the result was another set of huge fines 
and assessed court costs.  Currently, Sally owed thousands of dollars to the 
court.  Unfortunately, Sally’s low paying job was not sufficient to pay the 
full amount of the fines.  And again, living in an area lacking effective mass 
transportation to her work,23 how will she get to work?  Obviously the cycle 
continued, eventually ending in significant jail time for Sally.  After serving 
the sentence, she still did not have a driver’s license, had incurred even 
more fines, and had lost her job and, subsequently, the basic apartment 
where she and her sister were living. 
THE PREDICAMENT 
While perhaps more sympathetic than some, Sally’s story is little 
different than many others.  For a defendant who is impoverished, her 
failure to pay what could be thousands of dollars of fines is often the result 
of rational economic prioritizing.  In the State of Washington, someone like 
Sally may be able to avoid this cycle by entering into a variety of 
relicensing programs headed by prosecutors, the courts, or independent 
community agencies.24  Even so, the questions remain: Why must she go 
through this very difficult and time consuming hurdle to regain her driver’s 
license?  Why was her driver’s license revoked in the first place for not 
paying a fine? 
Of course, our society does not want people driving without valid 
driver’s licenses.  However, when the cycle begins, not because the 
defendant has proved to be an unsafe driver but with a driver’s license 
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revocation because she cannot pay her fines, then we are really using the 
criminal law to punish poverty.  The simple truth is that if many of us found 
ourselves facing the initial predicament of our defendant, Sally, we would 
take out our checkbook, put off buying that forty-two inch plasma 
television for a few months, write the check, and the problem would melt 
away.  Thus, when you watch the story of someone like Sally, you cannot 
help but conjure up images of debtor’s prisons from Dickens,25 or Patrick 
O’Brien’s tales of Captain Aubrey of the British Navy during the 
Napoleonic Wars.26  
If fifty or even one hundred people lost their driver’s licenses because of 
their inability to pay, the practice would raise serious justice issues.  In fact, 
we are talking about far greater numbers.  For example, in the State of 
Washington, 186,500 driver’s licenses are suspended each year.27  Most of 
these suspensions are for nonpayment of fines, and frequently fall upon 
low-income minorities.28  DWLS3 cases are estimated to constitute at least 
one-third of the calendars of the courts of limited jurisdiction in the State of 
Washington.29  This is a very serious issue.   
THE WAY WE SEE IT 
In this article, we use the operation of the courts in the State of 
Washington (Washington) charged with adjudicating misdemeanors, the 
courts of limited jurisdiction,30 as an example for our analysis.  Our reason 
for choosing Washington is simple: we live here and thus have access to 
court personnel and records, as well as prosecutors, public defenders, 
agency personnel, and such.  In doing so, we have found nothing in our 
research to give us reason to believe that Washington courts are atypical 
among the large number of states that revoke driver’s licenses for 
nonpayment of fines.  If anything, our research indicates that Washington 
courts are at the forefront in developing programs which help people get 
back their driver’s licenses once revoked for non-payment of fines.  
However, in spite of relicensing programs and the recent alterations to 
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existing law (Redmond v. Moore31 and RCW 46.63.11032), Washington has 
not effectively rectified the criminalization of low-income people who have 
had their driver’s licenses revoked.  We conclude that it is unacceptable for 
society to punish a person for his/her poverty, and, therefore, revocation a 
driver’s license for nonpayment of fines should never be an option for any 
state.        
In Section A, we will take an historical view of the use of prison to 
coerce payment of debt in civil and criminal cases, and the predictable 
failure of that system when used against indigents.  In Section B, we look at 
data from the courts of limited jurisdiction in Washington and in the State 
of Florida as an example of the extent to which state governments utilize 
driving-related fines for revenue.  In Section C, we will explore the 
rationales for licensing drivers, the lore and place of the automobile in 
American life, the use of fines as punishment for driving without a valid 
driver’s license, and the predictably failed results of revoking driver’s 
licenses to collect fines. In Section D, we will discuss various proposed 
solutions to the conundrum of fining the impoverished, explaining why 
none of these solutions are meaningful when dealing with a revoked 
license, and conclude with an explanation of why revocation of a driver’s 
license should never be used as a way to collect monies due from fines and 
tickets.   
A.   Use of Imprisonment to Collect Civil Debt and Criminal Fines 
We do not contend that the jails are currently overflowing with inmates 
whose licenses were revoked because they were too poor to pay traffic 
fines.  Nevertheless, we believe that an extensive discussion of so-called 
“debtor’s prison” is warranted for a number of reasons.  First, there are 
people who serve months in jail for repeatedly driving after their license has 
been revoked for failure to pay traffic fines.  Further, a review of the history 
of debtor’s prison shows that the philosophy underlying the use of 
revocation of driver’s licenses as a means of coercing payments is not the 
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sudden inspiration of some county auditor, but is deeply embedded in 
Western history.  Finally, and most importantly, that history demonstrates 
the futility of using the coercive penalogical power of the state to collect 
debts and accumulate revenue. 
1.  The Long and Distinguished History of Debtor’s Prison 
Civil Debt 
The use of imprisonment to collect debts by both the state and private 
individuals has a long pedigree, dating back 3,000 years.33  In early Rome, 
debtors were given thirty days to pay their debts.34  If a debtor failed to pay 
his debt, the creditor could place him under house arrest for another thirty 
days in hopes of shaking loose a few coins from the debtor, his family, or 
his friends.  If funds did not materialize by the end of the second thirty-day 
period, the creditor could sell the debtor into slavery35 to recoup his 
money.36  Analogously, in some American colonies, indigent debtors could 
be sold into indentured servitude.37  
By the reign of Justinian, in the sixth century, public debtor’s prisons 
replaced the earlier system of private capture, but the other aspects of 
private debt collection took a similar form.38  Then, with the rise of 
feudalism, arrest for debt all but disappeared.39  Feudal lords simply could 
not have their vassals, who were fodder in the Lord’s army, unavailable for 
military service because they were languishing in some debtor’s prison.  
However, as feudalism waned, imprisonment for debt returned with a fury, 
fueled by the Church, which characterized debt and insolvency as a sin.40   
In the thirteenth century in England, a series of Acts of Parliament41 
solidified a system employing incarceration for debt collections which 
continued well into the twentieth century. 
Under this system, arrest of the alleged debtor was accomplished via a 
series of writs.  For example, the Writ of Capias ad Respondendum 
(alternatively, termed the process of a “Mesne”), obtained at the inception 
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of a suit,42 allowed arrest to prevent the debtor from fraudulently hiding 
assets or fleeing.  The arrested debtor could obtain freedom by turning over 
the disputed property he was alleged to be concealing43 and/or posting bail 
to assure he would not flee.44  The Writ of Capias ad Satisfaciendum,45 on 
the other hand, was meant to insure collection of the debt once the court 
determined the debt was valid.  Thus, the debtor sat in prison until he, 
family, or friends came forth to pay.46  It was not unheard of for low-
income debtors to die in prison47 when family and friends could not help. 
Debtor’s prison, and the accompanying legal writs of Capias ad 
Respondendum (Mesne) and Capias ad Satisfaciendum, came to America 
with the colonists.48  Long after the ratification of our Constitution, there 
existed a federal debtor’s prison.49  In contrast to the separate English 
debtor’s prisons, debtors in the United States were generally thrown into the 
same jails with criminals.50  In fact, in 1830s Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, “three to five times as many persons were 
imprisoned for debt as for crime.”51 
Lest you think all this was part of a long ago, more primitive time, the 
threat of jail as a means of encouraging payment for private debt in 
America coexisted with remote-controlled color TV’s.  While by the 1920s 
every state abolished imprisonment for debt52 by Constitution or statute,53 
well into the 1960s there existed a great variety of approaches for the use of 
Mesne in tort and fraud cases.54  Thus, pleadings could be crafted to plead a 
contract claim (for which Mesne was not permitted) as fraud in the 
inducement (for which Mesne could be employed under law).55  By such 
framing of the pleadings, creditor’s counsel thus would raise the spectre of 
bodily arrest, thereby coercing the alleged debtor to settle56 rather than face 
arrest and jail.57 
Criminal Fines 
In 1910, 58 percent of prisoners incarcerated in jail58 were there because, 
when sentenced to a choice of fine or of jail time—a sentencing process 
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commonly characterized as “thirty dollars or thirty days”59—they could not 
pay the former.  By 1956, the percentage had risen to 67.5 percent.60  This 
use of jail as a means to extract a public fine from the defendant, her family, 
or friends was hardly anything new; like its civil counterpart, incarceration 
for non-payment of fines had a very ancient lineage. 
In feudal England, prior to the time when a fully evolved notion of a 
public criminal law existed and was distinguished from civil law, one who 
had committed what we would now term a crime (e.g., an assault) could 
avoid blood feud (i.e., private revenge) by paying compensation to the 
injured party or family,61 a procedure analogous to some remedies for 
wrongs found in biblical Mosaic law.62  During the Anglo-Saxon rule of 
England, the public notion of crime began to evolve.63  Initially, an assault 
in the presence of the feudal lord would require compensation not only to 
the victim, but also to the lord for the public offence.  The violator was 
required to compensate the lord for any crime done on his domain, whether 
in his presence or not.64   
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, William the Conqueror65 
recognized the economic potential of a public criminal law linked to raising 
revenue.66  Under his reign, those found guilty “in the King’s mercy”67 of 
any of a number of public crimes forfeited their liberty, but they could 
negotiate their freedom through payment of monies, or property, or both, to 
the King.  This final settlement leading to the criminal’s release was termed 
the Finalis Concordia,68 hence, the term “fine.”  Thus, the initial use of 
imprisonment was not to punish, but to raise revenue.69  It was not until 
1383 that the phrase to “pay fine,” which was a punishment, first appeared 
in a statute instead of the phrase to “make fine,” which were negotiations.70 
Fast forward approximately six hundred years to American soil.  The 
notion of fine still connoted punishment, but analogous to the time of 
William the Conqueror, jail was also used as a means of coercing its 
payment.71  Again, in 1956 approximately 67.5 percent of the inmates in 
jail72 were there because they could not pay their fines.73 
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Under such a regime, a constitutional assault on the imprisonment of 
indigents for non-payment of debt was inevitable.74  First, the Supreme 
Court found that equal protection was violated when an indigent defendant, 
who had served the statutory maximum jail term, was nevertheless kept in 
jail to “work off” his fine.75  Next, sending an indigent to jail to “work off” 
a fine for an offense punishable by fine only was held, by the Supreme 
Court, to run afoul to equal protection.76  Answering the criticism that 
indigents could never be punished for fine-only offenses,77 the Court 
specifically noted a variety of strategies for imposing the punitive sting of a 
fine on an indigent defendant (e.g., deferred or installment payments; 
community service in lieu of fine).78  Subsequently, due process was 
conjoined with equal protection79 to reverse a probation revocation when 
the order of revocation was based upon the probationer’s failure to pay a 
fine which was a condition of probation.80  The Supreme Court found that 
the lower trial court had erred when the judge failed to hold a hearing first 
to determine the defendant’s willingness and ability to pay.  For example, if 
the probationer did not pay because he simply had insufficient financial 
means and was acting in good faith, revocation was constitutionally 
prohibited.81 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court never dealt with the most common 
scenario under which most indigent defendant’s sit in jail (the situation we 
have referred to as “thirty dollars or thirty days”).82  The authors recognize 
that, analytically, the thirty days is an alternative punishment to the thirty 
dollars,83 and believe that fines can be effective punishments.84  If the 
choice was “thirty days or fifteen thousand dollars,” one might look at the 
constitutional dimensions of this issue differently.  But spending a dollar in 
1970, or five dollars and fourteen cents today,85 cannot begin to compare to 
the deprivation, unpleasantness, fear, and danger from a day spent in a 
cage.86  Given the alternative, the choice that any of us would make in this 
circumstance is clear:  Where’s my ATM card?   
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Interestingly, without any explicit Supreme Court pronouncement, the 
thirty dollars or thirty days sentencing format disappeared from our 
criminal jurisprudence.  It did not really expire under any noble 
constitutional banner (though courts may have seen the equal protection 
writing on the wall), but fell under the pennant of practical wisdom—this 
system simply served nobody’s needs.87  For, as in all the epochs in history 
when the impoverished have been jailed for their impoverishment, the 
practice has been counterproductive for both private and public actors. 
The Failures of Imprisoning Low-income Individuals to Coerce 
Payment of Debts or Fines 
The title of this subsection would understandably create reactions ranging 
from subtle observations concerning the inability to obtain “blood from a 
turnip” to more in-your-face criticisms like, “are you stupid; they don’t 
have any money—that is why we call them indigents.”  Strangely, this 
fairly obvious point has not always been apparent in the halls of history. 
While there were periods in history when the indebted, his family, or his 
friends had to support the costs of the debtor’s confinement to avoid his 
death,88 it was much more common for the creditor to pay the costs of 
maintaining the debtor in prison.89  Of course, the creditor’s hope was to 
call the debtor’s bluff, making him come forth with every asset he or his 
family could muster.90  And, if we were talking about the gambling debts of 
the profligate son of a wealthy squire or merchant in some eighteenth 
century English village, such tactics may have well been successful.  
However, if the debtor was low-income, and his friends and family are 
poor, imprisoning the debtor was not likely to prove an effective debt 
collection strategy.   
In the first place, the creditor had to financially maintain the debtor’s 
prison stay.  If the creditor stopped maintaining the debtor’s prison stay, the 
common law generally required the debtor’s release.91  While the debtor 
was in jail, he was unable to work to earn any money, and any employment 
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he did have was likely lost.92  After some period of time, depending on the 
type and amount of the debt (between one and nine months in jail), the 
debtor could take the poor “oath” establishing his indigence and be 
released.93  Essentially, the creditor threw good money in after bad to feed 
and shelter the debtor in jail, and the debtor walked out of jail without 
paying a penny. 
In the context of incarcerating debtors to induce payment of a fine, the 
historical results were just as counterproductive.  Society paid the expense 
of incarceration, and the cost was not insubstantial.94  On the other hand, 
the debtor could not earn money while in jail, he lost whatever job he had, 
was removed from family and other social support networks, and could 
have, as result of his short term confinement, transitioned from being a 
casual criminal to a confirmed offender.95 
In fact, only the Romans, who sold debtors into slavery, and the 
American colonists, who sold debtors as indentured servants, had a system 
for obtaining monies owed from those who possessed none.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution offered a serious impediment 
to this strategy.96  In spite of this, we still have not learned our lesson.  As 
detailed in section C, subsection 4, infra., by using revocation of driver’s 
licenses and the threat of jail to collect traffic fines, the lower trial courts 
are engaging in an endeavor as futile and contra-productive as its historical 
predecessors. 
B.  Revenue Gathering in The Courts of Limited Jurisdiction—Washington 
Returns to the Reign of William  the Conqueror 
Part of the problem in changing the system may be that traffic fines can 
be a lucrative source of government revenue,97 but exactly how lucrative 
they are is impossible to determine.  In the State of Washington, traffic 
fines are distributed according to statute and the base penalties for each 
infraction are established by court rule.98  For example, as of August 2005, 
the base penalty for general parking violations was twenty-four dollars,99 
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the base penalty for failure to respond to notice of infraction or failure to 
pay penalty was twenty-five dollars, and the base penalty for no valid 
driver’s license was $250. 
 Distribution of fine revenues in Washington is somewhat 
convoluted.  After certain deductions, the base penalty revenue is divided 
between the state and the local jurisdiction (32 percent going to the state; 68 
percent to the local jurisdiction).100  Monies allocated to local jurisdictions 
are deposited into the jurisdiction’s general fund, not the court system or 
law enforcement fund.  The state’s portion of revenues is deposited into its 
Public Safety and Education Account (PSEA).  In addition to revenues from 
infraction-based penalties, various statutes allow for special assessments to 
be deposited into the PSEA as well.  Some of these assessments are 
distributed, in part, to local jurisdictions.101  Calculating the total 
government revenue from traffic fines is virtually impossible because it 
requires reporting from all local jurisdictions (i.e., cities and counties) in the 
state. 
Even so, in fiscal year 2004, the state government of Washington 
collected more that $76 million in traffic fines and forfeitures.  While 
Washington was not able to provide a specific value for suspended licenses, 
the State of Florida reported $47,144,472 in revenues from individuals 
paying to reinstate their driver’s licenses from a revocation or suspension in 
2004.102  Although a state’s fine revenue often does not even equal 1 
percent of its total revenue, it is hardly an insignificant number.   
Furthermore, fine revenue is often more significant at the local 
municipality level—particularly for more rural locations.  For example, the 
City of Seattle’s general revenue for “Fines & Forfeits” in 2004 was over 
$18 million,103 which was only a small percentage of its total general 
revenue of more than $730 million.  This is primarily because the City of 
Seattle has an enormous base for property, business, and sales taxes.  
Contrast the City of Seattle’s percentage with that of Grant County.  
Although it covers 2,680 square miles, Grant County has only twenty-eight 
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and a half people per square mile.104  Over 47 percent of the county is 
unincorporated and the City of Moses Lake, the county’s largest city, has a 
population of 16,110.  Grant County does, however, have Interstate 90 
running right through it.  In its most recent published statement of revenue, 
Grant County listed “Fines & Forfeits” at $1,759,968.  This represented 8.5 
percent of its $20,483,301 total general revenue.105   
Finally, it is worth noting that fine revenue in Washington in 2004 and 
2005 was lower than in prior years because of the State Supreme Court’s 
decision in Redmond v. Moore.106  Again, that case found that the 
Department of Licensing could not validly suspend a driver’s license unless 
it first provided an opportunity for an administrative hearing.  The fallout 
from that decision was the invalidation of many suspended driving 
convictions and the penalties assessed for them.  With the new statute in 
place,107 licenses will once again be subject to revocation for non-payment 
of fines.  Accordingly, accompanying revenues should increase from those 
in 2004 and 2005. 
C.  The Driver’s License 
1.  A Practical Tool for a Practical Society 
In order to appreciate the problems associated with using driver’s 
licenses for debt collection, it is appropriate to first delve into the various 
policy rationales underlying the license requirement.  Not surprisingly, none 
of these rationales have any relationship to the use of the license as 
collateral for debt.   
There are few events in the life of an American teenager as significant 
and impacting as obtaining a driver’s license.108  A true cultural rite of 
passage, the driver’s license irrevocably represents crossing a line on the 
path towards independence and adulthood.  You can drive; granted, you 
may have to constantly negotiate to borrow a family vehicle, obtain a part-
time job to pay for insurance and gas, follow parental-imposed rules about 
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the number of passengers you can have, etc.   But you can drive.  
Freedom.109 
Society, however, has a different set of interests in licensing drivers,110 
rather than supporting an emerging sense of maturity and independence in 
its teenagers and freeing parents from endless trips to soccer fields and 
music lessons.  Obviously, driving an automobile is a complex task 
requiring a broad range of knowledge, skill, discipline, personal 
responsibility, and physical capacity.  If done poorly, even for a brief 
moment, driving can also be extremely dangerous and destructive.  These 
huge, heavy machines, hurtling through town and country, at remarkable 
speeds resulted in 42,643 deaths,111 2,697,000 injuries,112 and $230.6 billion 
in total economic costs from crashes in 2003.113 
Therefore, it makes sense to have a systematic method for insuring that 
those operating these very dangerous machines possess some minimum 
acceptable knowledge of the rules of the road, as well as a minimum vision 
requirement (with or without glasses), and a minimum level of competence 
commensurate with the ability to safely operate the machine.  Our licensing 
system involves a written test about the rules of the road, vision tests 
(including testing for red-green color blindness—a distinct disadvantage at 
stoplights), and a hands-on driving test.  The “diploma,” signifying the 
successful completion of all of the criteria for qualifying to enter the ranks 
of drivers, is the driver’s license. 
The conditional permission built into the notion of a driver’s license also 
provides a check and balance mechanism for denying access to these 
machines to those who, despite performing the fifteen-minute driving test 
satisfactorily, subsequently show themselves incapable or unwilling to use 
their automobile safely or wisely.  Thus, if a driver reveals that he or she is 
an unsafe driver (e.g., an excessive number of moving violations,114 driving 
while intoxicated, fleeing an injury accident, etc.), the driver’s license can 
be revoked, thereby denying him or her the legal right to operate an 
automobile on public roads.115  For those tending to carelessness, the threat 
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of impending revocation alone might make them begin to exercise more 
caution. 
Moreover, the driver’s license provides a standardized mode of 
identification.  This form of identification is widely recognized and used by 
various agencies and members of various law enforcement.  For example, 
many law enforcement agencies use an individual’s driver’s license to 
conduct a quick computer search for outstanding warrants for criminal 
offenses, traffic offensives, or other violations. 
Requiring all drivers to possess a driver’s license combines what could 
be termed an “actuarial” policy (i.e., on the average, those who complete 
this process and maintain their licenses will be safer drivers than those who 
have not) and a “bright line” policy (i.e., the driver is assumed competent if 
he/she possesses a valid license, and is presumed incompetent if he/she has 
no valid license, with no case by case assessment of competency).  The fact 
that someone is driving without a valid license neither causes actual harm 
nor necessarily increases any risk of harm, unlike other driving offenses 
such as reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, or vehicular homicide.   
Someone without a valid license could be a very safe driver, as could 
someone whose license had been suspended for reasons unrelated to his/her 
safe operation of his/her vehicle.  There is, in fact, no reason to believe in 
any particular case that the driver without a valid license might not be a 
better, safer driver than many with valid licenses.  We all know the roads 
are filled with terrible drivers, most of whom undoubtedly are driving with 
valid licenses.  In fact, it is challenging to drive more than a half an hour 
without encountering someone you want to scream at for doing something 
stupid and dangerous with his or her vehicle.  In fairness, most of us have 
had a moment of distraction or terrible judgment where we were the stupid 
and dangerous ones who, but for fortune, would have caused a major 
accident.  So, again, the lack of a driver’s license by a particular individual 
neither causes nor increases any risk of harm to themselves or to others.116  
While there are studies that establish a correlation between drivers with 
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revoked and suspended licenses and fatal accidents, these studies at best 
only tell us about alcoholics who continue driving.  As we will explain in 
the next section, these studies have nothing to do with drivers whose 
licenses have been revoked for non-payment of fines. 
Our making it illegal to drive without a valid license does not reflect a 
concern about individual criminality. Rather, the concern is a systematic 
one in which ad hoc, case by case assessment of each driver’s ability to use 
his/her automobile safely and legally must, as a practical matter, be limited 
to a single, fifteen-minute driving test.  This test leads to the presumption of 
competence carried by the license.  No license, no competence—a clear, 
bright line. 
We, therefore, criminalize and punish a person’s willingness to drive 
without a valid driver’s license.  It does not seem that we do so out of any 
real retributive sense117 (neither author has any moral reaction to unlicensed 
drivers—perhaps only a practical concern about their competence).  Rather, 
it is our desire for general deterrence118 which is at play.  Our systematic 
approach to insure a minimum, acceptable level of knowledge and 
competency revolves around the necessary cultural fiction that this 
knowledge and competency is reified in a small, rectangle of plastic-
protected paper which we dub a driver’s license.119  Our system entirely 
depends on you having a valid license to drive.  We threaten punishment to 
deter you from failing to work within this necessary system.  But what 
about revoking licenses for non-safety related reasons, and then threatening 
larger fines and jail if that person continues to drive?  
2. Revoking Driver’s Licenses to Collect Fines and Parking Tickets 
Revoking a driver’s license because the driver has shown to be unsafe on 
the road is totally appropriate.  Giving the state the ability to revoke the 
conditional permission built into the notion of a driver’s license once a 
driver endangers or causes harm to others, is one of the rationales for 
licensing.  Drivers who display that they are incapable or unwilling to 
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engage in this extremely dangerous activity in a reasonable manner simply 
must be taken off the road.  We are, after all, literally dealing with life and 
death.  But, as discussed at the beginning of this article, many licenses are 
revoked for reasons totally unrelated to driving safety; rather, the 
revocations are directly linked to failure to pay traffic fines.120 
 A Closer Look at the Issue of Safety 
Currently, some individuals might respond that criminal penalties, 
including incarceration, are justified for DWLS based on studies revealing a 
significant correlation between drivers whose licenses have been suspended 
or revoked and fatal automobile accidents.121  These studies show that in 
twenty percent of fatal accidents in America, at least one of the drivers was 
unlicensed.122 On a state by state comparison, the percentage of fatal 
crashes involving at least one unlicensed driver range from a low of 6.1 
percent (Maine) to a high of 23.1 percent (New Mexico).123  And one study 
shows that, though numerically the vast number of fatal crashes involved 
licensed drivers,124 drivers with a suspended or revoked license are 3.7 
times more likely to be in a fatal crash than a legally licensed driver.125  
This data sounds like pretty convincing support for dealing harshly with 
those driving on suspended licenses like our Sally, until you look closer. 
In fact, these studies primarily considered drivers whose licenses had 
been suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol 
(DUI).126  People who drink and drive are exceptionally dangerous.127  They 
also tend to keep driving, even after one DUI conviction.128  Thus, one 
might question whether it is more than coincidental that, in New Mexico, 
the state which has the highest percentage of unlicensed drivers who are 
involved in fatal accidents,129 over 66 percent of drivers whose licenses 
were revoked for DUI continue to drive.130  Not surprisingly, police report 
that alcohol is involved in a high percentage of fatal crashes.131 
One plausible interpretation of these studies is that they tell us far less 
about unlicensed drivers than about drunk drivers.  Driving with a revoked 
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license is really a proxy for a serious alcohol addiction.  Therefore, these 
studies tell us little more than what we already know about alcohol, drunk 
drivers, and fatal accidents. 
In contrast, there are no studies evaluating those driving with licenses 
suspended for reasons unrelated to safety (e.g., non-payment of fines): 
More recent work has begun to look more closely at drivers who 
were suspended for reasons other than DUI violations, but details 
describing those other subpopulations and statistically valid 
evaluations of programs designed to address their specific needs 
are  lacking at this time.132 
Though cited for the generic proposition that those found guilty of 
DWLS are dangerous,133 the cited studies plainly have no bearing on our 
situation.  The main study offering the impressive 3.7:1 ratio focused its 
analysis on two-car crashes in which only one person was found at fault (as 
evidenced by the issuance of a ticket for a moving violation).134  The study 
did not specifically correlate the lack of a valid license with fault.  In other 
words, the study never said unlicensed drivers were 3.7 times as likely to be 
at fault in fatal crashes; rather, the study found that unlicensed drivers were 
more likely to have been one of the drivers in a fatal crash, victim or 
otherwise.135   
In fact, even if we pretended that these studies involved license 
revocations for unpaid fines, the inferences connecting those with 
suspended licenses to fatal crashes still would be far from clear.  Thus 
pretending that those whose licenses were suspended for nonpayment of 
fines were in the study, the inference from the 3.7:1 ratio in fatal crashes 
would not necessarily lead to any conclusion about driver safety.  That is 
because, if we look at DWLS for nonpayment of a fine as generally being a 
proxy for poverty, then we are talking about a subpopulation that is driving 
crummy cars with poor safety features (e.g., no disk brakes, no airbags, 
etc.).  Thus, fatality could be more a function of the quality of vehicle a 
low-income person can afford than the quality of his driving.  In fact, some 
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states found it economically unfeasible to impound cars for nonpayment of 
fines, principally because the cars routinely were such “junkers” that they 
were worth less than the fines owed.136  Of course, all of this is more than 
speculation; it is fantasy.  We only imagined that the study involved drivers 
whose driver’s licenses were suspended for nonpayment of fines.  In reality, 
there is no such study. 
It is thus apparent that the use of revocations, further fines, and 
incarceration for the failure to pay traffic fines is not for the purpose of 
keeping us safe while on the roadway.  It is to collect revenue.  The system 
is not saying, “Do not drive without a license;” it is saying, “Do not drive 
until you have paid your fines and tickets in which case you’ll get your 
driver’s license back.”  But the use of the criminal sanction for these ends, 
and in the particular context of allowing or denying the ability to drive, has 
very different social consequences than does the normal use of  a 
penological threat aimed at deterrence. 
Take burglary as an example.  As a society, we do not want individuals 
to engage in burglary.  We threaten jail to deter you and we will 
“specifically deter”137 and “incapacitate”138 you by placing you in prison if 
you are not deterred by the threat of the sanction and nevertheless choose to 
commit the crime.  But, as a society, we are comfortable in the belief that 
no one needs to burgle.139  If you are a junkie, get treatment.  If you cannot 
afford your lifestyle, cut back and sell your toys.  If you are too poor to pay 
for food and shelter, seek out some public or private social service.  If the 
problem is that you simply do not enjoy conventional employment, then 
prison is simply the inevitable cost of your chosen profession. 
While, as an abstract proposition, no one needs to drive, reality may be 
otherwise (at least when you’re living in an area, like all too many, where 
no effective mass transportation system exists).140 All this merely reflects 
what amounts to a cultural truth: the entire American lifestyle is built 
around, and interwoven with, the automobile.141 
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3. The Automobile and the Life it Created 
After demonstrating the reliability of the “horseless carriage” through a 
series of highly publicized demonstrations between 1906–1910,142 the 
automobile was almost instantaneously transformed from “novelty to 
necessity”143 in the American consciousness.  In 1904, 54,590 automobiles 
were registered in America.144  Eight years later, nearly a million were 
registered.145  By 1920, eight million were registered.146  Likewise, sales 
between 1904 and 1912 increased from 22,130 a year to 356,000 a year.147  
In the process, America was transformed both socially and economically.148 
Most obviously, automobiles changed the landscape and geography of 
America as huge amounts of capital flowed to reshape society to fit the 
car.149  Vast networks of roadways and highways150 responded to the call of 
the motorcar for access and freedom, and the main streets and villages151 of 
Norman Rockwell’s152 America gave way to businesses and shopping areas 
relocated within “driving distance.”153  At the same time, city planners also 
let the automobile dictate the way, adopting the “expensive and ultimately 
unworkable policy of unlimited accommodation to the motorcar.”154 
Thus, for better or worse, current American society is structured around 
moving in cars.  This reality carries both ideological and practical 
dimensions.  Ideologically, we are a culture which prizes freedom of 
individual movement.  The “open road,” the lure of what is “around the 
next turn” is in some sense a modern replication of the psyche of our 
pioneer ancestors who trekked across this land during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.155  This is a nation with unrestricted freedom of 
travel.156  We have no internal borders, no visas to travel from state to state.  
One can wake up in the morning and walk, drive, fly, or train in any 
direction time if resources permit. 
For most Americans, work and home are connected by roads.  Without a 
car, it is not easy to get to work.157  In fact, many jobs offering more than 
the most minimum wages require that the applicant have a vehicle.158  This 
includes most government positions and most construction jobs.159  For 
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many, if you cannot drive, you cannot work.  If you cannot work, you 
cannot make money.  If you cannot make money, more likely than not, you 
cannot pay fines for tickets.  So for the poor, who do not have the money to 
pay their initial traffic fines, which then results in suspension of their 
licenses, the legal mantra that “driving is a privilege not a right,”160 rings 
hollow.  The reality is that many need to keep driving, even though their 
licenses are suspended.  
This leads to another way in which our situation is different than 
deterring a crime such as burglary.  We do not want you to burgle, end of 
story.  While we do not want you to drive without a license, that is not the 
end of the story.  We are not indifferent to you being able to drive; we 
affirmatively want you to be able to drive, at least when required for work, 
obtaining food, clothing, shelter, and caring for family.  So, therefore, the 
proposition that if you cannot pay your fines and tickets, you simply cannot 
afford to drive, fails to grasp the larger picture. 
4. The Futility and Social Harm from Employing License Revocations 
and Jail Time to Coerce Revenue.161  
This current dilemma is no different in the twenty-first century than it 
was in the 1300s.  Debtor’s prison does not work when the debtor is 
impoverished.  No money will be collected while the debtor is incarcerated, 
and he or she likely will be poorer when released.  At the same time, the 
fine, license, and revocation “cycle” clogs court calendars, uses up 
significant police resources in the form of serving warrants, overcrowds the 
jails, and costs a fortune in expenses to incarcerate the indigent driver.  The 
experience of the Washington courts bears witness to the counterproductive 
results of ultimately using the threat of jail to collect fines:   
The most important aspect of these revisions [in Washington law 
in 1993] is that a driver can no longer be arrested on charges of 
[failure to pay (FTP), failure to respond (FTR) to a summons, or 
failure to appear (FTA)] at a hearing for a traffic infraction.  
Instead, the authority to incarcerate a violator is now based on the 
newly described crime of driving with a suspended license.  In the 
majority of cases, the chargeable crime is third-degree DWLS, 
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based on an unpaid fine for a traffic infraction.  The establishment 
of these misdemeanor provisions [was] viewed as a viable means 
of enforcing court orders and of reducing the high FTA/FTP rates 
associated with traffic infractions. 
The new laws backfired.  FTA/FTP rates increased because 
offenders failed to appear for hearings on the DWLS charge in 
addition to failing to appear for hearings on the underlying charge 
and failing to pay the original fine. Local courts were soon issuing 
bench warrants in record numbers, and law enforcement officers 
were executing a larger than average number of warrants during 
routine traffic violations.  As a result, jail costs increased 
dramatically throughout the state, with unusual circumstances: 
some rural sheriffs reported making the decision to let violators go 
rather than cite them for DWLS third-degree, since local criminal 
justice system costs were getting out of control.162 
Moreover, as shown from the experience of using debtor’s prisons, from 
the Middle Ages through the first half of the twentieth century, the real cost 
of the practice falls on the wider society.  If you cannot work because you 
are not allowed to drive, we pay for social services and welfare for you and 
your children.163  You do not contribute to societal productivity.  You do 
not pay taxes.  You have less of a stake in the broader society; for work 
engenders more than just earning economic income.164  You will be more 
likely to try to get money through criminal means, or fill all the hours with 
nothing to do and little sense of self-esteem by numbing yourself with 
narcotics.  Any children you have will live in a less stable home and likely 
lack a strong, positive role model—all of which will extort a societal price 
from future generations.165   
D. Current, Yet Problematic, Solutions for Indigents to Pay Court 
Fines 
There are a variety of methods currently used by lower trial courts to 
collect fines from low-income defendants.  Before considering the efficacy 
of each of these methods once a defendant’s license has been revoked for 
nonpayment, we will first consider how each of these methods will likely 
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impact the indigent defendant possessing a valid driver’s license who now 
faces his first set of fines.166 
1. Installment Plans and Deferred Payment Plans Generally 
This system for alleviating unrealistic economic demands on the indigent 
has proven somewhat effective in a number of court systems,167 and even 
bears the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court.168  However, 
there are consequences if you fail to meet your payments.  For instance, you 
will be brought into court on a “show cause” hearing169 where the court will 
require you to show why you should not be assessed the full amount now or 
even thrown into jail for civil contempt (assuming you have the money) 
until you pay.  So what, you may respond; if you appear to be abusing the 
leniency and accommodation that allows you to pay in installments, the 
court has every right to make you come back and explain.   
While this may seem to make complete sense, the situation has some 
complex facets.  The defendant may have paid his traffic fine, but, due to a 
clerical mistake the fine still shows on his record.  Or, the defendant may 
have honestly believed he “sent that check out with the electricity bill and 
car payment,”170 yet because of the transient and/or chaotic existence of the 
indigent,171 he may have never received the notice of his court hearing.  
Even if the defendant received the notice, he may have transportation 
problems: his junker car broke down; his cousin who was to drive him 
failed to show up.  He may be afraid to jeopardize his job if he goes to court 
and not to work, and yet be afraid to tell his supervisor about his legal 
problems.  Of course, if he does not show up to court, there will be charges, 
fines, and other costs for failure to appear.  A warrant will be issued and 
warrant costs will be added to the original fine.172  When he is arrested, he 
will be taken to jail where he will likely remain for a day or two before his 
court appearance.  As a result, the individual may lose his job, thus 
inadvertently creating more financial strain on his ability to pay the court.  
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All that said, offering payment plans is a welcome evolution in dealing with 
spiraling fines and low-income defendants. 
A New Generation of Rational Payment Plans that Still Fall Short 
Some courts in Washington have begun a system that is sensitive to low-
income driver’s inability to pay their traffic fines.  In one court system, a 
special “relicensing calendar” gives first-time DWLS3 offenders a chance 
to keep their licenses by setting up a payment plan.  Once the defendant has 
made the first payment, a hold is placed on their license suspension for a 
year, during which time he can pay off the fine.173  In another Washington 
court system, the DWLS3 offender meets in a session with an ombudsmen 
and a representative of DOL to work out a payment plan.  They then go to 
criminal court, the defendant waives his right to a speedy trial, and the case 
is continued ninety days, at which time the defendant must report on his 
progress.  If needed, the court will continue the case to give the defendant a 
reasonable chance to pay off his fines and keep his license.174  In another 
forum, a non-profit community agency works with the defendant, 
interceding with the court on his behalf.175  The agency will work out a plan 
where the court will withdraw the outstanding fines from collection, waive 
the collection fees, set up a payment or community service plan, may 
reduce the total fines, and lift the hold on the driver’s license as soon as the 
first installment is paid.  Some courts have even developed plans with 
collection agencies, setting a low-income payment scale and lifting the 
suspension after the first payment.176   
All of these approaches are far preferable to previously available options 
for the low-income driver who has lost his license due to nonpayment of 
fines.  Yet, all is not so rosy.  If the defendant misses an installment 
payment, he is off the plan.177  Once again, he will not have a valid license.  
To get back on the plan, he will have to pay significant fees.  If the plan 
involves a collection agency, he may be required to pay 50 percent of the 
total debt owed.178  For people so close to the margin, not having the extra 
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money to pay an installment any particular month is not an unlikely 
scenario.  A lost job, a sick child, or a breakdown of the junker auto, may 
cause the money to be unavailable that month.  After all, this debt doesn’t 
represent anything “real” in this person’s life; it is made up, a societal 
construction which does not correlate to any human need like food, 
clothing, and shelter.  When the money is spent on fines, the indigent 
person has nothing to show for it, except that the state may leave him alone.  
So what will these well-intentioned payment plans really accomplish?  For 
some, it will all work out well.  They will make their payments and keep 
their licenses.  But for many who are low-income, the plan which seemed 
so promising at first will crumble.  Soon, their licenses will be suspended 
and the government will be on their backs—more fines, more arrests, more 
warrants.179  For the state, whatever additional monies they collect through 
these payment plans will be offset by costs for program administration, 
warrants, court hearings, and other similar expenses. 
Thus far, we have been talking about the working poor.  However, many 
people on welfare or Social Security Income (SSI)180 also need cars to shop 
and take themselves and their children to the doctor.  When the Department 
of Social and Health Services (DSHS) allocates $440 per month for a 
person to live, expecting the recipient to consistently pay $75 a month to a 
court payment plan, where the money basically goes into the ozone, is a bit 
unrealistic.   
2. Community Service 
Providing the option of community service to pay off fines is a 
reasonable one so long as the defendant has legal transportation to get to the 
site.  In this payment alternative, a court has the discretion to allow 
community service in lieu of paying a fine.  The court has the discretion to 
determine which fines may qualify for such a program.  In the City of 
Seattle, the defendant is credited $10 toward their fine for every hour of 
community service.181  The problem, of course, is that while doing 
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community service, the defendant cannot go to his job.  In community 
service the defendant earns “money,” but it can only go to fines, not to 
life’s basic needs.  The conterproductive possibilities from this scenario are 
apparent.  Time spent at community service cannot be devoted to seeking or 
engaging in paying employment.  In fairness, most courts are flexible about 
when this service can be done, offering opportunities to fulfill the 
community service on the weekend for those working during the week, and 
vice versa. 
While superficially appealing, using community service in the revoked 
license context is problematic.  Initially, giving the defendant the ability to 
pay off his fines through community service does not give him a driver’s 
license, at least not until the fine is paid off.  At a scale like Seattle’s $10 
rate, paying off a fine which could be thousands of dollars would require 
well over one hundred hours of service, and, thus, would deny the 
defendant a license for a very long time.  This service also would consume 
large blocks of time which otherwise could be dedicated to finding and/or 
going to work.  This impediment to being reasonably available to the 
employment market would be further exacerbated by the fact that the 
defendant still cannot legally drive (even to the community service site).   
Admittedly, this dilemma could be obviated if, analogous to payment 
plans, the defendant would receive a license upon completing a set number 
of community service hours, and then making monthly “installment 
payments” of community service hours.182  Putting aside the cost and 
burden of the administrative structure needed to maintain the long-term 
accounts required for multiple “installment payments,” problems may arise 
during a month that an installment payment is owed (e.g., the defendant’s 
child becomes ill, a car breaks down, the defendant must suddenly move 
from her home to a shelter to flee domestic violence). 
At this point, familiar problems arise.  Plainly, the defendant could go 
into court and explain the situation.  But, if his life is in chaos, it may be 
unrealistic to expect him to take the initiative to set a court hearing date on 
466 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
his own (particularly, given the “sociology of poverty,” discussed infra  
section E, subsection 1).  The court could, of course, send notice to the 
defendant and set a hearing, but that raises all the problems of the lack of 
reliable communication in the life of many low-income people.183  If a 
hearing is set and the defendant fails to show up, presumably his license 
will be revoked again.  He might never receive notice of the revocation and, 
once again, unwittingly be driving on a revoked license.  Once arrested and 
brought back into court for this new DWLS3 charge, he will owe even more 
money, including costs like those accompanying reinstatement with the 
community service payment plan. 
3. Collection Agencies  
Many courts now contract with collection agencies to which they assign 
delinquent traffic fines.184 Notices from collection agencies certainly work 
with the authors—our credit is a big deal.  We are not saying that the 
indigent are indifferent to such things.185  They want to buy cars, and many 
dream of one day pulling themselves out of poverty and owning a house.  
All in all, referring unpaid fines to collection agencies is far more socially 
beneficial and rational than simply holding defendants in contempt and 
jailing them.  Nevertheless, there are some problems.  Poorer citizens are 
often transient and do not maintain a reliable means of receiving notices 
and communications (like those from collection agencies) as do more 
economically stable members of our society.186  Moreover, collection 
agencies add fees on top of the fines, which can mount over time creating a 
nearly insurmountable economic burden for the indigent.187  While 
collection agencies sometimes offer payment plans geared to low-income 
defendants, the availability of such a payment option may vary with the 
particular court, with the same collection agency offering this option for 
defendants from some courts in the jurisdiction and not others.188  Also, 
collection agencies offering a payment plan geared to low-income 
defendants may add the traffic fines to any other debt the defendant owes 
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which is also under collection (e.g., furniture), and will only send notice to 
the court of fulfillment of the defendant’s obligations when all amounts 
owed (including those not resulting from traffic infractions) are eventually 
paid.189 
Finally, there is another factor at play.  A representative interviewed from 
the non-profit community-based organization that helps people reactivate 
their licenses explained that of the 150 people they see each month, 75 
percent could get back their licenses, yet only 20 percent of this group did 
so.190  Why?  This is a function of what one could term “the sociology of 
poverty.” 
E. The Difficulties Continue: A Recommendation to Scrap the Entire 
Enterprise 
1. The Sociology of Poverty 
A report by Washington State courts concluded that the great majority of 
those caught in the cycle of unpaid tickets, failed court appearances, and 
revoked licenses were not in that situation due to negligence or 
indifference; they simply were not capable of dealing with the court system 
which both intimidated and overwhelmed191 them with its perceived 
complexity.192  In that regard, their inability to work through the court 
system likely parallels experiences many of us have had with large, 
bureaucratic institutions.  As Professor Lawrence Shulman has noted, 
The reader can surely provide numerous examples in which the 
size and complexity of a system, difficulties in communications, or 
the ambivalence of the system towards its clients cuts them off 
from the services they require.  Since the individual who needs to 
use the system is also complex, feels some ambivalence towards 
the service, and has difficulty in communications, breakdowns 
become almost inevitable.193 
Also, the conclusion of the Washington State Report is completely 
consistent with social work research that has found that the strength of a 
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person’s motivations to pursue and complete a given goal is strongly 
influenced by their own belief in their capability to achieve the goal.  This 
concept, termed “self-efficacy belief,”194 
. . . ‘determine[s] their level of motivation, as reflected in how 
much effort they will exert and how long they will persevere in the 
face of obstacles.’  Research has suggested that the stronger the 
belief in one’s capabilities,  the stronger will be the effort to reach 
the goal.195 
Most of us understand this from our own experiences, probably those 
from school.  If we felt unsure of solving algebra problems with several 
unknowns, we would half-heartedly struggle for a while, and then throw 
down our pencils.  No one can function without self-confidence.  Of course, 
part of that confidence is actually having the requisite knowledge and skills.  
In other words, our confidence problem in algebra may have been justified 
by a lack of knowledge, and we needed to meet with the teacher to work on 
solving these equations.  
Life skills—effectively organizing, communicating, negotiating your 
way through governmental institutions and private bureaucracies—are no 
different.  A well-regarded approach to social work is based on the 
construct that the clients actually possess the skills needed to cope,196 but 
that they do not recognize their own capabilities.  Nonetheless, social 
workers recognize that some individuals lack skills needed to effectively 
interact with other individuals and institutions, and that these skills must be 
imparted. 
For example, the Director of Social Work Clinical Field Studies at 
Seattle University, herself a social worker with twenty-five years 
experience, told us that  
An emerging trend in programs such as homeless transitional 
housing is to incorporate a one-on-one relationship with a 
casework manager into the project.  The manager will require 
weekly meetings, both to develop the necessary habit of keeping 
track of and fulfilling regular commitments with those in authority 
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and to install life skills, such as setting goals, budgeting, keeping a 
checking account, planning menus, shopping for food, and such.  
Alternatively, part of the commitment may be to attend a series of 
weekly life skills classes.197  
Helping impart these skills (directly or indirectly through appropriate 
resources) thus is as much a part of the social worker’s world as teaching 
how to solve particular equations is of the algebra teacher’s. 
Skills training.  One gift that the social worker can bring to clients 
is the knowledge of particular skills for living that clients may find 
give them new options, which can be empowering because by 
using those skills clients may come to have more voice and 
influence over their worlds.198 
In fact, when discussing the type of “coping skills” that are needed to 
interact with institutions, one social work text notes: 
This method goes beyond simply giving information; you will be 
teaching clients skills in manipulating their environment so as to 
achieve desired outcomes.  You may need to teach clients how to 
claim their rights and entitlements.  Teaching coping skills 
require[s] a painstaking consideration of the small details of daily 
living.199 
Everyone reading this article possesses these skills to a greater or lesser 
degree.  Most of us did not consciously study or train to learn them.  These 
skills were imparted in the fabric of our daily reality.  This is obviously not 
the case for so many of those whose licenses have been suspended for 
failure to pay fines, and who are now trapped in “the cycle.” 
2. Decriminalization of DWLS for Nonpayment of Fines: A Beginning 
Recently, there have been discussions in Washington about 
decriminalizing DWLS3 for nonpayment of fines.200  This would eliminate 
debtor’s prison for low-income individuals, and save local jurisdictions the 
costs associated with enforcement by police, the large expense of criminal 
court resources, and the costs of incarceration.  But, low-income people 
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would still not have their driver’s licenses.  They would keep driving, keep 
getting cited for DWLS3 and various equipment-related tickets, and just 
owe more and more to the state than they would ever be able to pay. 
3. The Solution: The Choice Not to Revoke for Nonpayment  
In the previous section we looked at various options for dealing with the 
loss of a driver’s license due to nonpayment of fines.  We concluded that 
none of these options are appropriate and that the entire notion of revoking 
driver’s licenses for nonpayment of fines should be rejected.  So, where 
does this leave us?  If a driver signs a promise to appear and fails to appear 
(FTA), a warrant should issue.  The authority of the court must be 
respected, and those flaunting that authority cannot be ignored.  If drivers 
simply do not pay tickets, however, the state should collect the money 
through any of the methods we discussed.201  Also, as an additional 
incentive to payment, we need to educate people about the consequences of 
not paying tickets on their credit record.202  From the experience of all the 
attorneys and agency members we have interviewed, other than a relatively 
small group of scofflaws (estimated at 8 to 10 percent),203 most people want 
to pay their tickets.  They just do not have the money; they are low-income 
and just holding on, or truly impoverished.  Even if it turns out that much of 
the money they owe will not be not collected by the methods we have 
discussed,204 as we have seen, the economic and social costs of using 
driver’s licenses as a wedge to collect money leaves the net balance of 
society’s balance sheet overwhelmingly in the red.205 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever solution one arrives at for the problem of collecting fines, 
society should never revoke a driver’s license for non-safety related issues.  
Using revocation to collect revenue is the functional heir of the debtor’s 
prison.  Most low-income individuals need to drive to continue working.  
But if they continue to drive, they will go to jail, avoidable only by paying 
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the monies owed—monies they do not have.  This current variant on what 
is basically a medieval theme replicates that same futility and resultant 
harm to the interests of the wider society that debtor’s prison has always 
borne. While it is beyond the scope of this article to recommend the best 
option for collecting fines from low-income people, we have discussed a 
number of reasonable methods.  However, courts simply must come to 
accept that government cannot even partially fund itself on the backs of the 
poor by using the threat of incarceration.  It is time for the courts to stop 
hitting their heads against the wall. 
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professional responsibility.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002); 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBITLITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 68–69 (John S. 
Dzienkowski ed., 2001-2002) (noting attorneys cannot bring frivolous cause of action). 
 Rule 11, however, by its terms only applies to pleadings “present[ed] to the court,” 
and not to an oral or written threat to file a pleading.  See FED R. CIV. P. 11(b).  So, what 
if the unscrupulous attorney threatens a less educated debtor with filing a pleading that 
on its face permits Mesne?  Again, that would be a matter of professional ethics, and 
enforcement would depend on the debtor going to the Bar, which seems unlikely under 
these circumstances.  See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a); 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 87-88 (noting a lawyer “shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact to a third person...”). 
57 While Mesne appears to have disappeared from the legal landscape, it is unclear 
whether legal regimes still leave room for its use.  See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 
(no imprisonment for debt, “except in case of absconding debtors”).  An “absconding 
debtor” has been defined as “one who leaves or is about to leave, the jurisdiction, or who 
conceals himself [to avoid process].”  Burrichter v. Cline, 28 P. 367, 368 (Wash. 1891).  
See also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12 (no imprisonment for debt, “unless upon refusal to 
deliver up his estate for benefit of his creditors in such a manner as shall be prescribed by 
law, or in cases of tort or where there is a strong presumption of fraud.”); ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 18 (“no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud”). 
58 See Westen, supra note 36, at 779. 
59 See generally id.; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970). 
60 See Westen, supra note 36, at 779.  See also Note, The Equal Protection Clause and 
Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938, 939 n.8 
(1965–1966) (“Periodic studies of Philadelphia’s Reed Street Prison and the Baltimore 
County Jail between 1940 and 1950 indicated that approximately 60% of all persons 
imprisoned in these institutions had been committed for nonpayment of fines.”) 
[hereinafter Note, Equal Protection]. 
61 See Westen, supra note 36, at 780.  After 449 B.C., the “Twelve Tables,” became the 
first known written code of Rome which put all the oral laws into written form.  Vogt, 
supra note 36, at 338–39.  “The laws specified the amount of compensation to be offered 
for various injuries and required an injured party to accept an offer of compensation.”  
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Westen, supra note 36, at 781.  See also ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 10 (Clyde Pharr, 
ed., Allan Johnson et al., trans., University of Texas Press 1961). 
62 See Westen, supra note 36, at 780.  See also Exodus 21–22, in TANAKH: A NEW 
TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 
(The Jewish Publication Society 1985). 
63 See Westen, supra note 36, at 782. 
64 Id. 
65 William the Conqueror (ca. 1028–1087) was the Duke of Normandy.  In 1066, he 
sailed to England, defeated the Anglo-Saxons at the Battle of Hastings, and was crowned 
King.  E.g., NEW YORK TIMES, GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE 1069 (2004). 
66 See Westen, supra note 36, at 783. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 784. 
70 Id. at 784-85.  Williams, 399 U.S. at 239 (imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine 
“dates back to medieval England”). 
71 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 240; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971).  See, e.g., 
James, supra note 52, at 182; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 939, 946; See 
also Incarceration of Indigents Unable to Pay Criminal Fines, 84 HARV. L. REV. 46, 47-
48, 51–52 (1970–71) [hereinafter Incarceration of Indigents]. 
72 See supra note 60. 
73 Imprisonment for criminal fines, regardless of the practical effect, has never been 
characterized as involving debtor’s prison.  Medieval English courts viewed enforcement 
of fines as a function of the court’s contempt power.  See, e.g., Ford, supra note 33, at 26; 
Westen, supra note 36, at 806–7. 
74 The equal protection argument, raised so forcefully in 1969 by Derek A. Westen, 
supra note 36, at 796, and in 1966 in Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, had been 
clearly articulated in 1881: “In the first place, no law abridging the liberty of the citizen 
should be permitted to remain upon the statute books of a free and enlightened people 
that metes out a different punishment to the poor and friendless from that imposed on 
others.”  Arnoux, supra note 52. 
75 Williams, 399 U.S. at 242–43. 
76 Tate, 401 U.S. at 397-98. 
77 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 243; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669–70 (1983) 
(“The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—
rich and poor—who violate its criminal laws.  A defendant’s poverty in no way 
immunizes him from punishment.”); Westen, supra note 36, at 800.  Incarceration of 
Indigents, supra note 71, at 49 (“A problem may arise, of course, if an indigent cannot 
pay his fine even on the installment method, since absolving him of the fine would mean 
that an affluent defendant would sustain a greater aggregate penalty.”).  But see Criminal 
Law—Alabama Raises the Rates, supra note 49, at 739 (in Alabama, as part of plea 
bargain for which they are given a fine, indigents waive their right to later claim 
poverty). 
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78 See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399-400 (court discusses various state solutions for collecting 
fines, other than imprisonment).  See also Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 
49. 
79 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661–62. 
80 Id. at 661–63 
81 See id. at 661–62. 
82 See Williams, 398 U.S. at 243 (“It bears emphasis that our holding does not deal with 
a judgment of confinement for nonpayment of a fine in the familiar pattern of alternative 
sentence of ‘$30 or 30 days.’”).  See also Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 52. 
83 See, e.g., Westen, supra note 36, at 786; Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 
52-53. 
84 See generally GILES PLAYFAIR & DERRICK SINGTON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND 
CURE 101–04 (1965); Westen, supra note 36, at 810 (“There is evidence that the fine, if 
properly imposed, is an effective deterrent.”). 
85 This calculation is courtesy of my colleague from Economics and Finance, Dr. Peter 
Brous, who compared the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for urban areas, non-seasonally 
adjusted, for 1970 and 2005.  Telephone Voice Mail from Peter Brous, Associate 
Professor of Finance, Department of Economics, Albers School of Business and 
Economics, Seattle University, to John Mitchell, Associate Professor of Law, Seattle 
University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2005). 
86 Implicit in Williams, 399 U.S. 235, was the assumption that imprisonment is worse 
than a fine.  See Incarceration of Indigents, supra note 71, at 47. 
87 See, e.g., FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 9 (“Also the court policy of ‘pay the fine or serve 
the jail sentence’ became a practice for criminal traffic fines.  However, this resulted in 
costing the city more money for the use of jail space than the amount of the original fine, 
which the defendant failed to pay.”). 
88 “[I]mprisonment in the Middle Ages was the least expensive of punishments because 
prisons were self supporting.  Jailkeepers earned their living by extorting money from 
inmates and their relatives and friends.”  Westen, supra note 36, at 784.  Accord XI SIR 
WILLIAM SHOLSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 567 (1938); MANN, supra note 
50, at 87 (“debtors had to provide their own food, fuel, and clothing . . . or they did 
without.”). 
89 See BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 4–5; Ford, supra note 33, at 40; Note, Present 
Status, supra note 42, at 314 n.56. 
90 As Johnson remarked of one debtor, “I can put him in [jail] any day, but that will not 
pay the debt.”  MANN, supra note 50, at 29.  See also James, supra note 52, at 148 
(“Incarceration for failure to pay debts ended because it largely failed to accomplish its 
purpose: to force the repayment of the money owed”); Vogt, supra note 36, at 343 
(“[I]mprisonment rarely had the effect of recovering property.”) Vogt, supra note 36, at 
345 (“Imprisonment often failed to accomplish the desired outcome of repayment 
because some debtors chose to remain in prison rather than be stripped of their assets”) 
(footnote omitted); Ford, supra note 33, at 47 (“There is reason to think that creditors 
actually collect very few legitimate claims by the use of imprisonment.”); Coleman, 
supra note 37; Note, Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 943 (“It seems obvious that 
depriving the accused of his liberty could not possibly have coerced payment of a fine he 
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was incapable of paying, and would necessarily prevent the defendant from earning 
money with which to pay the fine.”). 
91 See Ford, supra note 33, at 40; Note, Present Status, supra note 42, at 314 n.56.  See 
also BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 4-5; MANN, supra note 50, at 29; Arnoux, Civil 
Imprisonment, supra note 52 (imprisonment for debt self-defeating); Robinson, supra 
note 55, at 297 (“Attachment of the body in civil process has no justification as a method 
of satisfying a fair claim, either in contract or in tort.  To shut a man up in prison doesn’t 
in any degree or to any extent pay the debt or damage.”); Westen, supra note 36, at 807 
(“[T]he fundamental reason for abolishing imprisonment for debt is not to avoid 
punishing the debtor but to avoid the imprisonment which makes it impossible for him, 
as for the indigent criminal defendant, to earn money for the lack of which he is being 
imprisoned.”); Vogt, supra note 36, at 343–44 (“[S]ince most debtors [in the colonies] 
were insolvent, imprisonment only worsened their condition by piling up court and jail 
cost in addition to the initial fine.  [In fact, the system only] burdened the community 
with the cost of caring for the debtor’s dependents.”). 
92 See Ford, supra note 33, at 45–46; Westen, supra, note 36, at 794. 
93 See Vogt, supra note 36, at 344; Note, Present Status, supra note 42, at 313–15. 
94 “Imprisonment in such a case [when the defendant cannot pay a fine] is not imposed 
to further any penal objective of the State.  It is imposed to augment the State’s revenues 
but obviously does not serve that purpose; the defendant cannot pay because he is 
indigent and his imprisonment, rather than aiding collection of the revenue, saddles the 
State with the cost of feeding and housing him for the period of his imprisonment.”  Tate, 
401 U.S. at 399. 
 See also Westen, supra note 36, at 788, 788 n.90 (“A state which imprisons a criminal 
offender for a 20 dollar fine at the rate of one day in prison for each dollar of fine not 
only loses the 20 dollars that probably could have been collected by other means [fn 
omitted] but incurs the added expense for imprisoning the offender for 20 days.  
Imprisonment is the most expensive of modern punishments.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Carrie Wood, Connecting the Dots—Community Court System Offers Alternative 
Services, Not Jail, REAL CHANGE, June 8-14, 2005, at 4 (In King Co. Washington, “Jail 
time for minor criminals . . . costs about $92 a day”).  See also MAXWELL, supra note 3, 
at [13] (“The King County Correctional Facility charges the City of Seattle $121.58 per 
booking and $63.54 per day in maintenance fees.”); id. at [37] (The total cost of jailing 
offenders for suspended licenses in Seattle “is $1.2 million dollars per year.”). 
95 See Westen, supra note 36, at 794 n.122, citing PLAYFAIR & SINGTON, supra note 84, 
at 24–25, 27–28, 42, 105–06. 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (slavery abolished). 
97 Equal Protection, supra note 60, at 946 (“[F]ines have become an important source of 
government revenue.”). 
98 WASH. INFRACTION R. CTS. LIMITED JURIS. 6.2. 
99 Id. at 6.2(d). 
100 See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.46.120 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.100 (2005). 
101 Mr. Jeff Hall, the Executive Director of the Board for Judicial Administration in 
Washington, pointed out that the Board was in the process of reviewing the complicated 
formula of assessments and replacing it with a higher base penalty.  E-mail from Jeff 
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Hall, Executive Director, Board for Judicial Administration, to Kelly Kunsch, Reference 
Librarian, Seattle University School of Law (June 1, 2005) (on file with authors). 
102 E-mail from Randy Ball, Policy Coordinator, Executive Office of the Governor of the 
State of Florida, Public Safety Unit, to Kelly Kunsch, Reference Librarian, Seattle 
University School of Law (July 22, 2005) (on file with authors).  The year 2004 is Fiscal 
Year 2004-2005.  Id. 
103 CITY OF SEATTLE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 64 (Dec. 31, 2004). 
104 SCOTT D. DWYER & MARY B. DWYER, 2005 WASHINGTON STATE YEARBOOK: THE 
EVERGREEN STATE GOVERNMENT DIRECTORY 141 (2005). 
105 See GRANT COUNTY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND 
CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE, ALL GOVERNMENT FUND TYPES FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 2000,” available at 
http://www.co.grant.wa.us/auditor/Accounting/AnnualReport/annual.htm. 
106 Moore, 91 P.3d 875.  “Court revenues decreased over the past two years due to the 
Supreme Court ruling on driving with suspended license cases.”  See, e.g., CITY OF LAKE 
FOREST PARK, SUSTAINABLE BUDGET POLICY PROCESS 17, available at 
http://www.cityoflfp.com/city/budget/default.html.  The graphic on the page shows a 
reduction from about $340,000 in 2003 to below $310,000 for 2004.  Id. 
107 WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110. 
108  
For the American male (and men elsewhere), infatuation with the automobile 
is loaded with sexual freight.  Worship of the car begins in childhood and 
reaches the auto-erotic phase at the onset of puberty, when cars, like girls, are 
still worshipped from afar.  The older adolescent readies himself for his 
driver’s license much as he prepares himself to lose his virginity, and so it 
goes until he locks himself into a union that makes no provision for divorce.  
Recurring bouts of vapor lock are not sufficient grounds for ending the 
marriage, nor will an epidemic of transmission problems justify an annulment.  
In a world created by the automobile, the automobile rules.   
CHRISTOPHER FINCH, HIGHWAY TO HEAVEN 12 (1992).  See also FLINK, AUTOMOBILE 
AGE, supra note 23, at 160-62. 
109 “At a practical level, the appeal of the automobile is easily described.  Unlike the 
train, or the trolley car, or the bus, it goes where and when you want, stops where and 
when you want.  Certainly this appeals to every American’s sense of God-given 
independence . . .”  FINCH, supra note 108, at 11. 
110 Government certification of competent driving was well established in Europe by the 
turn of the twentieth century.  JAMES J. FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS THE AUTOMOBILE 
1895–1919, at 174 (1970) [hereinafter FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS].  However, before 
1901 U.S. states had very little to do with motor vehicles.  Carl Watner, Driver’s 
Licenses and Vehicle Registration in Historical Perspective, in NATIONAL 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS 101 (Carl Watner & Wendy McElroy eds., 2004).  Rather, 
whatever regulation existed was imposed by the cities.  For example, Chicago had a 
licensing law in 1898 (later declared unconstitutional) and in 1899 required the 
examination and licensing of all drivers.  Id. at 102.  The real impetus for licensing, 
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however, came from “automotive interests” in the form of the American Automobile 
Association and the Automobile Club of America.  FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra, at 
175; Watner, supra, at 104.  Interestingly, safety concerns did not appear to be a central 
factor in the initial movement for licensing.   
 One thing is clear from historical record: While the justification for government 
licensing of automobile operators was sometimes a safety issue, in a majority of the 
states, driver competency examinations were not imposed until years after the initial 
licensing regulations were adopted.  Watner, supra, at 103.  Thus, among twelve East 
Coast states between January 1, 1909 and October 4, 1909, 89,495 driver’s licenses were 
issued, and only twelve people were rejected for incompetence (ten in Vermont).  FLINK, 
AMERICA ADOPTS, supra, at 178.  In fact, even in the 1930s and 1940s there were states 
where no examination was required for a driver’s license; one merely paid a fee.  Watner, 
supra, at 104–05. 
111 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2003, at Ch. 4 Table 34 (2003), available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/ITSFAnn/2003HTML/cov2.htm. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at Summary (statistics include reported and unreported crashes for year 2000). 
114 Washington State revokes licenses of “Habitual Offenders” (i.e., three major 
violations or twenty moving violations within a five year period, see WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 46.65.020 (2005)).  WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.291(3) (2005).  Other states have 
similar laws; Florida, for example, suspends licenses based upon a point system.  See 
SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 32. 
115 It is well-established in our society that driving is considered a “privilege”, and not a 
“right.”  See Watner, supra note 110, at 109.  
[T]he general legal consensus is that driving is a privilege, not a right.  How 
we reached that point remains to be explained, but the actions of the American 
Bar Association’s National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws should not be overlooked.  Started in 1889, as part of an effort to 
standardize state laws, the Commissioners developed a Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Operation and Chauffeur’s License Act in 1926.  This was at a time 
when driving was still recognized as a common law right in at least the eight 
states, which issued no licenses (either operator or chauffeur) at all.  Thus the 
ABA, under its self-appointed mandate to produce uniformity [of laws] among 
the states, labored to license every driver in America. 
Id. at 109–10.  There are those, however, who contest this proposition that driving is a 
privilege.  They maintain that access to the public roadways is a fundamental right 
(whether by foot, horse, cart, or car), and that while the state may set driving laws (e.g., 
speeding) and hold people civilly accountable for their accidents, it may not require 
licensing of non-commercial driving.  See, e.g., Jack McLamb,  Driving A Right, Not a 
Privilege, AID AND ABET NEWSLETTER, Feb. 3, 2003; see also Jack McLamb, Driver 
Licensing vs. The Right to Travel, http://www.uslawbooks.com/travel/travel.htm (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter McLamb, Driver Licensing].  An interesting variant 
asserts the rights of bicyclists vis-à-vis motorists.  See Steven G. Goodridge, The Right to 
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Travel by Human Power, 
http://www.bicyclinglife.com/EffectiveAdvocacy/TheRightToTravel.htm (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2005). 
116 Similarly, while a driver’s license provides good identification when required in some 
roadway encounter, it would seem no better than, for example, a passport (though it may 
be that some police computer systems are keyed to driver’s license numbers, and the 
passport would offer a less efficient entry into their databases). 
117 See SINGER & LAFOND, supra note 6, at 25 (“The alternative major explanation for 
punishment is retribution.  Retribution argues that those who do wrong (i.e., criminal) 
acts deserve punishment, and that it should be imposed on them even if it serves no 
utilitarian purpose.”); DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 11 (“Retributivists believe that 
punishment is justified when it is deserved.  It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely 
chooses to violate society’s rules.”). 
118 “General deterrence” theory “posits that punishment of a criminal . . . reduces future 
crime . . . [because] other persons, contemplating committing crimes and learning of the 
threatened punishment, will decide not to do so.”  SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 6, at 
19; see also DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 10. 
119 See McLamb, Driver Licensing, supra note 115, at § Regulation, Question One 
(stating that a driver’s license is a proxy for competence). 
120 One could argue that those ticketed for moving violations (e.g., running a stop sign) 
who fail to accept the punishment (i.e., fine) are failing to acknowledge responsibility for 
their unsafe driving and therefore likely to continue driving unsafely.  The problem with 
this argument is its major factual premise.  Likely over 90% of those failing to pay traffic 
tickets do so not out of some sense of indifference to their actions; they want to pay their 
tickets—they do not pay because they do not have the money.  See Interview with Mary 
Wolney, supra note 5; Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19. 
121 See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [10-11]; SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 16-17; 
David J. DeYoung et al., Estimating the Exposure and Fatal Crash Rates of 
Suspended/Revoked and Unlicensed Drivers in California, 29 ACCID. ANAL. AND 
PREVENTION 17 (1997). 
122 See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
123 Id. 
124 See DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 21, Table 1.  See also SCOPATZ ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 55, Table A1 (showing national statistics). 
125 See DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 17 (abstract), 21.  See also SCOPATZ ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 8, 16–17.  In general, the study showed that in California 
“suspended/revoked [hereinafter S/R] and unlicensed drivers are over represented in fatal 
crashes by about a factor of 2-5, relative to their presence on the road.”  De Young et al., 
supra note 121, at 19. 
126 See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 9, 20. 
127 For example, in 2003, alcohol was involved in 40% of fatal traffic accidents.  
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 111, at Ch.2 Table 
34 (2003), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/ITSFAnn/2003HTMLTSF/tbl34.htm. 
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128 For example, “Driving again while intoxicated after being convicted of DUI is fairly 
common if the person suffers from alcoholism.  For the social drinker, the experience of 
the criminal law is so bad that the likely will never drive after drinking again.  But for 
those with the disease, relapse is a normal part of treatment . . .  [and] they probably will 
drive again after drinking because part of the disease is loss of control. . . . My hunch is 
that [even after a DUI conviction] 30-25% will drive while intoxicated.”  Telephone 
Interview with Ken Urich, Chemical Dependency Professional/Clinical Social Worker at 
Assessment and Treatment Associates, Bellevue, Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 
11, 2005). 
129 See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
130 Id. at 17. 
131 Id. at 65.  “[T]hese drivers [involved in fatal crashes across the country] tend to be 
young, male, more likely to have consumed alcohol before driving, more likely to have 
been driving all night, been recently convicted of DWI, and to have three or more 
suspensions or revocations.”  MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [11].  See also SCOPATZ ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 67-68 (high percentage of S/R in fatal crashes have previous DUI 
convictions). 
132 SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
133 See, e.g., MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [9] (“Thirty year’s worth of traffic safety 
research has shown a correlation between license status and collisions, since drivers with 
suspended or revoked (S/R) licenses are at a greater risk for involvement in fatal traffic 
accidents.”). 
134 DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 18. 
135 Id. at 21.  See also SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 8 (“Their [DeYoung’s group] 
methodology has limitations, however, most notably the need to establish the identity of 
the driver at fault in a fatal crash.”).  But cf. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [11].  In 2000, 
Seattle City Attorney, Mark Sidren, testified at a sentencing guidelines hearing that in 
reviewing 427 traffic collisions in which “at least one driver had S/R status . . . S/R 
drivers were at fault 75% of the time, and that 88% of those drivers were third-degree 
DWLS defendants.”  Id. at [11].  Sidren did not state how many of these 427 accidents 
involved both drivers with S/R status.  See id.  
 Also, as the California study itself identified, there could be a “negative halo” effect, 
with police attributing fault to one of the driver’s because of their S/R status when, 
without the S/R, neither driver would have been found at fault and the accident would not 
have been included in the study.  DeYoung et al., supra note 121, at 20. 
 Finally, in a high proportion of fatality accidents involving S/R drivers, the S/R 
drivers were riding motorcycles.  NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 111, at Motorcycle. 
136 See SCOPATZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 40, 45. 
137 See supra note 6. 
138 See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 10.  “[T]hose who commit criminal acts have rejected 
important social norms have thereby demonstrated their willingness to continue to do so 
in the future.  Thus, for the good of those who abide by the law, these offenders must be 
prevented (incapacitated) from re-offending.”  SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 6, at 22.  
Some believe that during this incapacitation, incarceration should fill the function of 
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rehabilitation.  Id. at 23–25.  “This theory holds that offenders can be ‘changed’ into 
‘non-offenders’ if given proper ‘treatment.’”  Id. at 23. 
139 But, what if a parent must break into a pharmacy late at night to obtain medication of 
their very sick child, and if the parent does not burgle the pharmacy, the child will most 
likely die?  For that, our society provides the “defense of necessity”: 
“necessity. 1. A justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency 
that he or she did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe than 
the harm that would have occurred but for the person’s actions. For example, a 
mountain climber lost in a blizzard can assert necessity as a defense to theft of 
food and blankets from another’s cabin.—Also, termed choice of evils; duress 
of circumstances; lesser-evils defense.  2. A privilege that may relieve a person 
from liability for trespass or conversion if that person, having no alternative, 
harms another’s property in an effort to protect life or health.” 
A HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 460-61 (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 2000). 
140 In America, we have made the choice to rely on the private automobile for urban mass 
transportation:  
Urban populations may rely upon systems of mass transit, as in Moscow, 
Russia, or on the automobile, as in most urban areas in the United States.  In 
Europe, governments heavily subsidize mass transit and make it expensive to 
drive automobiles.  In the United States, a combination of public subsidies for 
highways and disinvestment in mass transit has resulted in a heavy reliance on 
the automobile.  In most metropolitan areas, less than 10% of commuters use 
public transportation, and in most Sunbelt cities, the proportion is 5 percent or 
less.   
Dennis R. Judd, Cities and the Environment, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH ON URBAN 
POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 400 (Ronald K. Vogel ed.,1997) (citations 
omitted).   
Perhaps the larger public policy question is the role of the Automobile in 
American life.  Legislative bodies have made and continue to make laws from 
the perspective that driving is privilege and not a right.  There is not doubt that 
driving and owning a vehicle have specific legal and financial responsibilities 
attached thereto.  However, the reality is that we are a society that relies 
heavily on our mobility, especially for employment and to access services for 
ourselves and our families.  Urban areas, with high-density population centers, 
are generally served by rapid transit, but others, like Los Angeles or Dallas, 
are only just beginning to invest in public transit infrastructure.  Even cities 
with good rapid transit systems cannot provide the level of service that many 
citizens must have to meet their employment and family needs.  Residents in 
our rural areas are truly dependent on their vehicles and often have few options 
available for paying fines.  Standardizing and expanding compliance options 
available throughout Washington would benefit many of our citizens.   
MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [49-50]. 
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141 See generally  FINCH, supra note 108; FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110; 
FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23; HOLTZ KAY, supra note 23. 
142 See FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110, at 50–51. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 58. 
145 Id. 
146 See Megan Shaw and Rick Prelinger, Manifest Congestion: Freeway Landscapes and 
Timescapes, BAD SUBJECTS, Oct., 1998, available at http://www.eserver.org/bs/40/shaw-
prelinger.html-73k. 
147 See FLINK, AMERICA ADOPTS, supra note 110, at 58. 
148 See id. at 2.  With the automobile industry also comes mass production, multidivision 
corporations, modern management techniques, and consumer credit.  Id. 
149 See FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23, at 3. 
150 For a discussion on the creation of our highway and road system, see HOLTZ KAY, 
supra note 23, at 224-233.  See also FLINK, AUTOMOBILE AGE, supra note 23, at 368–
376. 
151 See JAMES J. FLINK, CAR CULTURE 178 (1978) [hereinafter FLINK, CAR CULTURE]. 
152 Norman Rockwell (1894–1978) was an illustrator whose scenes of American life 
reflected the innocent and ideal aspects of our culture.  E.g., NEW YORK PUBLIC 
LIBRARY DESK REFERENCE 224 (4th ed. 2002). 
153 See FLINK, CAR CULTURE, supra note 151, at 178–79.  See also FINCH, supra 
note 108, at 343:  
After the war [WWII], wagons became even more popular, while conventional 
sedans began to offer more and more trunk space.  Such space was still useful 
on long journeys, but it found regular employment in trips to the market, the 
hardware store and the shopping center.  When cars became smaller, 
manufacturers made certain that they continued to offer plenty of storage 
space, knowing that this had become an everyday requirement.  Even the 
smallest of the subcompacts was offered in a station-wagon format, and a 
novel solution to increasing carrying volume was found in the three-door or 
hatchback formula, which combined the looks of a sedan with some of the 
features of a wagon.  All these developments were designed largely to enhance 
the automobile as a shopping tool. 
 In this way, the shopping environment has shaped the car, and reciprocally 
the car has shaped the retail environment.  The original strips evolved into 
mercantile eco-systems in which the space allocated to parking dictated low-
density development.  The mall concept permitted the return to a city-style, 
high-density shopping experience, but it too was predicated on the automobile 
and hence demanded either huge lots or elaborate parking structures.  Such 
parking structures are often handsome, in a functional way, and some are 
successfully integrated with the architecture of the actual shopping precinct.  
Often, though, the mall is sited to take advantage of low land values and hence 
surrounds itself with an apron of raw parking space. 
154 See FLINK, CAR CULTURE, supra note 151, at 164. 
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155 See, e.g., STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1996). 
156 While we are not making a constitutional claim, plainly the construct of the “freedom 
of locomotion” pulls a variety of constitutional threads which merit mention.  “The idea 
of a right of locomotion is neither novel nor radical.  Americans have enjoyed the 
freedom to walk the streets and move about the country free from unreasonable 
government intrusion for many years.”  Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to 
Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260 
(1990). 
 Initially considered a “natural right” protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the United States Constitution see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 555-56 (2d ed. 1988), the right to locomotion found a home in 
other portions of the Constitution following the death knell of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (case 
eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
holding that it only applied to rights of “national citizenship”).  See also TRIBE, supra.  
 Thus, the right to interstate travel found support in both the very structure of a 
constitution creating a federal republic, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 
(1969) (one year residency requirement for welfare violates implicit guarantee in 
constitution that “all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our 
land”), and in the Equal Protection clause, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339–40 
(1972) (“In Shapiro, we explicitly stated that the compelling state interest test would be 
triggered by ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [the right to 
travel] . . . ’”).  The right to intrastate locomotion has found constitutional support under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gordon Hill, The Use of Pre-
Existing Exclusionary Zones as Probationary Conditions for Prostitution Offenses: A 
Call for the Sincere Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173, 
185 (2004), and, for some, under attributes of the Fourth Amendment, see Maclin, supra, 
at 1261. 
157 See supra notes 140–41. 
158 See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [37].  “[T]ransportation and the status of individual 
driver’s licenses [are] two potential barriers to employment or advancement to higher 
paying jobs.”  Id. at [7].  See also HOTLZ KAY, supra note 23, at 39: 
Red Hook’s isolation has given it a perverse ‘end-of-Western-civilization’ chic 
to the artists and activists attracted to its warehouses.  Nonetheless, working 
life for the old residents is an oppressive circle.  The highways that destroyed 
the neighborhood caused its emptying.  The emptying produced low density, 
which undercut public transportation and kept income down.  The low-income 
inhabitants lack money to buy a car and hence find work, and, thus, the 
neighborhood deteriorates further.  It is a cycle.  A few years ago, Kassinitz 
conducted a survey at the South Brooklyn Local Development Corporation, an 
employment agency interviewing out-of-work community members applying 
for jobs.  Three hundred people came looking for work, but only 9 percent of 
the adults had driver’s licenses.  ‘Here’s a place that hires a lot of truck drivers 
and this agency couldn’t place them.’ 
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159 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. 
160 See supra note 115. 
161 Again, such futility has accompanied every attempt to coerce revenue from the poor 
throughout history.  See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
162 MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [19-20] (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
163 “A valid driver’s license is frequently one of the most important assets that an 
unemployed individual has.”  Id. at [39].  A study of the impact of driver’s license 
revocation in Wisconsin thus found: 
As in many parts of the country, many of Milwaukee’s jobs have left or are 
leaving the downtown core area and moving to the suburbs and other outlying 
areas, some of which have limited public transportation service.  Combined, 
job location, bus schedules, and child care requirements make having a car and 
a valid driver’s license critical to job retention.  Suspended [driver’s] license 
holders who need their jobs to pay off their fines may find it difficult to retain 
those jobs, especially if they require a valid driver’s license.   
 Research from the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee indicates that the 
two greatest barriers to the employment or better employment are 
transportation and childcare.  They are, of course, often linked: transportation 
plays an essential role in delivering children to affordable childcare centers 
and then taking the parents to the workplace.  This is especially critical for 
single parents (mostly female), who are the special focus of many programs 
designed to help people make a transition from welfare to work.   
Id. at [39-41]. 
164 “Work provides a person in this culture with an identity.  ‘I’m a nurse’ has a cultural 
moral overlay that I can see myself as ‘worthy’ (as opposed to being a sponger) in that 
I’m contributing to society, provides the feeling of being ‘productive’ so valued in our 
culture, and (especially for women) economic independence.”  Telephone Interview with 
Dr. Ruth White, Program Director of Social Services, Seattle University, in Seattle, 
Wash. (Sept. 8, 2005). 
165 Vehicle impoundment, one proposed “solution” to keeping S/R drivers off the road, 
has only compounded the misery of drivers suspended for nonpayment of fines.  
Impoundment of cars driven by those whose licenses were revoked for DUI, or other 
safety-related causes is an effective way to keep these drivers off the road.  See SCOPATZ 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 19-21.  See also MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [6], [19-25].  In the 
Seattle impound program, however, 85% of the cars impounded were for drivers whose 
license had been suspended for nonpayment of fines.  See id. at 27].  Further, the 
impoundments had a strong racial bias.  “According to the data collected in 1999, more 
than 40% of the approximately 5,000 cars impounded for DWLS violations were driven 
or owned by African-Americans, who overall comprise 11% of the Seattle population . . . 
.”  Id. at [28].  We think that the consequences of taking the vehicle, which is frequently 
the single most valuable asset of a poor or low-income person, from someone who cannot 
even afford to pay their fines are obvious.  Impoundment can also lead to ripples of 
incredible injustice, as shown by the following story related to me by Mary Wolney.  See 
Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5: 
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While in the hospital for kidney problems, the client’s friend borrowed his car without 
his knowledge.  The friend, who had his driver’s license suspended for nonpayment of 
fines was stopped by the police, and when his DWLS3 status was discovered the car was 
impounded.  (The impound ordinance let police impound any car driven by a suspended 
driver, regardless of the registered owner.)  By the time the client got out of the hospital, 
five days of storage charges (at $30 per day) had been added to the several hundred 
dollars of impound charges.  When he told the towing company that he could not pay, 
and they should just sell his car for what he owed, he was told that statutory requirements 
for auction of the vehicle by a towing company involved a process that would take thirty 
days.  At the end of the thirty days, a month’s storage costs had pushed his tab well over 
$1,000.  After his car was auctioned for $200, the towing company assigned the balance 
to a collection agency. 
166 Some have suggested that fines be “proportioned” by income, with fines reflecting 
current bail reports or public defender eligibility reports.  See, e.g., CLIVE HAMILTON, 
THE AUSTL. INSTITUTE, MAKING FINES FAIRER (2004); Australia Should Change System 
of Traffic Fines: Think Tank, AUSTL. ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSFEED, Jan. 16, 2005 
(Domestic News); Westen, supra note 36, at 812.  In theory, lower fines for the poor 
would make it more likely that they could pay the fine and avoid a license suspension. 
167 See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 5, 30-31.  See also Westen, supra note 36, at 816.  In 
collecting payments, some courts are trying to incorporate the use of credit cards and 
even the internet.  FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 5, 8, 43 
168 See Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5. 
169 Westen, supra note 36, at 819-20. 
170 See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30] (there are “people who simply forgot about the 
court appearance or fine and had their [driver’s] licenses suspended because of honest or 
careless oversight”). 
171 See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19 (clients are always moving around; 
those who came from out of state will go back for periods of time without notifying the 
agency; they also may not have regular phone service). 
172 See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 30. 
173 See Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel, supra note 17, at 29; MAXWELL, supra note 3, at 
[32]; Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. 
174 See MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [37-39].  See also Interview with LaVerne Jones, 
supra note 19.  In a study, those in the CAMP program had an eleven-fold decrease in 
DWLS3o convictions, compared to a three-fold decrease in the control group, and thirty-
nine times the collection rate than the control group.  MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [42-
46]. 
175 See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19. 
176 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. 
177Id..  While the new Washington statute generally mandates payment plans similar to 
these court programs, see supra note 14, the plan also contains similar obstacles for the 
low-income or poor defendant.  Failure to make a payment results in a driver’s license 
suspension (absent a court finding of “good cause,” which as a practical matter 
presupposes the defendant receiving notice of the hearing and appearing).  WASH. REV. 
CODE § 46.63.110(6)(a).  Also, while administrative costs for the court payment program 
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are low ($10/infraction or $25 for the payment plan, whichever is less), id. § 
46.63.110(6)(c), the rule permits the court to “contract[ ] with outside entities” to 
administer the payment plan, id. § 46.63.110(6)(d).  That means collection agencies and 
the costs and fees associated with that private enterprise already discussed. 
178 Telephone Interview with John Boquist, Vice President, Alliance One Collection 
Agency, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 17, 2005). 
179 See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110. 
180 Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19. 
181 Telephone Interview with Eileen Kato, Judge, Seattle District Court, in Seattle, Wash. 
(Sept. 4, 2005). 
182 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.  The new Washington statute, see 
supra note 11, provides that community service can substitute for cash payment of fines 
as part of an installment plan.  WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.110(6)(e). 
183 See supra note 171. 
184 See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 34-35.  See also supra note 12. 
185 See FEREBEE, supra note 3, at 59. 
186 See supra note 171. 
187 In the State of Washington, these additional fees can be up to 50% of the outstanding 
fines.  See supra note 12. 
188 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5; see also Interview with John Boquist, 
supra note 178. 
189 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.  However, some courts have 
agreements with the collection agency so that the repayment plan only includes the traffic 
fine and fees.  Id. 
190 See Interview with LaVerne Jones, supra note 19. 
191 In MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30], the Report noted three categories of DWLS3o 
defendants.  The first is “[t]he can nots: individuals who are disorganized in many 
aspects of their lives, and who consider a ticket or a court date as one more 
overwhelming event.”  The Report went on to state: 
While no statistics are available regarding the composition of suspended 
drivers, a large amount of continually evolving anecdotal evidence states that 
most fall into the first category.  “Can nots” are people who are easily 
overwhelmed by what others consider basic tasks.  For them, the idea of 
avoiding payments and court appearances results in harsher penalties is 
difficult to comprehend or accept.  They view courts and bureaucracies in 
general as formidable obstacles that cannot be dealt with easily or effectively.  
As a result, many members of this group are unable to find or hold jobs, or to 
perform such simple tasks as obtaining auto insurance.   
Id. at [31]. 
192 LAWRENCE SHULMAN, THE SKILLS OF HELPING INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, GROUPS, 
AND COMMUNITIES 714 (6th ed. 1999). 
As is often the case, the very institutions set up to solve problems became so 
complex themselves that new problems were generated.  Social, medical, and 
educational systems can be difficult to negotiate even for individuals who are 
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well equipped to deal with them, let alone those with limited education and 
resources.  The services established for people are often so complex that it is 
difficult for individuals to make use of them. . . . A third factor contributing to 
breakdowns in the individual-system relationship is the size of a bureaucracy.  
For example, finding the right department in a large government agency can 
be a frustrating, even overwhelming, task. 
Id. 
193 Id. 
194 William J. Reid & Elizabeth Misener, Adult Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
WORK DIRECT PRACTICE 246 (Paula Allen-Meares & Charles Garvin eds., 2000). 
195 Id. (citations omitted). 
196 See, e.g., Peter De Jong & Scott D. Miller, How to Interview for Client Strengths, 40 
SOCIAL WORK 729 (1995). 
197 Telephone interview with Mary Kay Brennan, Clinical Assistant Professor and Field 
Director for Social Work, Seattle University, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 29, 2005).  See also 
Céline Mercier & Guylaine Racine, Case Management with Homeless Women: A 
Descriptive Study, 31 COMMUN. MENTAL HEALTH J. 25, 25-27 (1995); Nancy Wolff et 
al., Cost Effectiveness Evaluation of Three Approaches to Case Management for 
Homeless Mentally Ill Clients, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 341 (1997). 
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Mattaini et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). 
199 Beulah R. Compton & Burt Galaway, Interview Methods to Mobilize Client Power, in 
SOCIAL WORK PROCESSES 343-44 (Brooks/Cole Publ’g Co., 6th ed. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
200 See Boruchowitz, Right to Counsel, supra note 17, at 27 (“Another alternative would 
be to decriminalize some minor offenses, including DWLS3 for people whose driver’s 
licenses are suspended only for failing to pay tickets.”).  In fact, at a King County 
Regional Justice Summit in 2003, decriminalization was on the agenda.  Id. 
201 An issue arises regarding the common failure of low-income and poor drivers who fail 
to have insurance.  While not the focus of this article, we recognize that it is a significant 
issue in its own right, both because of the magnitude of the fines and because some may 
contend that you should not drive without insurance, and you should be denied a license 
if you persist in driving without insurance (as opposed to losing your license just for not 
paying a fine). 
202 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5. 
203 See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.  See also Interview with LaVerne 
Jones, supra note 19.  Cf. MAXWELL, supra note 3, at [30-31] (court found suspended 
drivers generally fit in one of three categories: “The Can Nots,” “The Did Nots,” and 
“The Will Nots”—‘Scofflaws who intentionally avoid paying fines or appearing in 
court”).  The majority of those suspended for nonpayment fell into the first category.  Id. 
at [31]. 
204 If we do not revoke driver’s licenses when people fail to pay tickets, questions arise of 
what to do about the unpaid fines at the point the person goes to the DOL to renew their 
driver’s license.  We would propose that they go to a specially designated DOL center 
where a specialist helps them work out a payment plan (backed by reasonable 
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enforcement mechanisms).  Alternatively, violators could fill out an affidavit of 
indigency, reacquire their driver’s license, and the state could seek enforcement of fines 
through other enforcement methods discussed. 
205 One superficial impediment to not revoking driver’s licenses for nonpayment is the 
Non-Resident Violation Compact.  WASH. REV. Code § 46.23.010 (Art. IV(a)) ( 2005).  
In the past, an out-of-state driver stopped for a traffic violation would be hurried in front 
of a court or thrown in jail because, otherwise, the jurisdiction knew that the driver would 
drive back home and they would never get payment of the fine.  The Compact avoids this 
vacationer’s nightmare by agreeing that if our resident gets an out-of-state ticket, 
payment on that ticket will be enforced by the home state.  The problem is that under the 
Compact the remedy for nonpayment of your out-of-state ticket is suspension of your 
driver’s license by your home state.  Why this is the sole remedy, instead of the home 
state agreeing to indemnify the foreign state and then using any method they choose to 
get the ticket paid, seems a mystery.  Yet, in any event, being a signatory on the Compact 
would, at most, mean that those who fail to pay out-of-state tickets, (only a small 
percentage of those revoked for nonpayment), will have their driver’s licenses suspended. 
See Interview with Mary Wolney, supra note 5.  Given that driving an automobile is not 
even considered a “right,” (see supra note 115) minimum scrutiny equal protection 
analysis will apply, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 
(1993), and the distinction between revoking the driver’s licenses of those whose tickets 
are out of state, and not those who are in state, will pass constitutional muster because 
under a rational basis analysis, there is a “strong presumption of validity,” the challenger 
must “negative every conceivable basis which might support it,” and the supporting 
rational may rely entirely on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.”  Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314-15. 
